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Financial institutions have extended their competitive realm through issuing warrants as retail products. By comparing 
products from different financial institutions which are similar in all respects, but are differently priced through different 
implied volatilities, market inefficiencies are demonstrated. Competition between issuers lead to clearly identifiable 
market strategies. It is further argued that issuers, by providing less than complete market information, have developed a 
position of relative strength, compared to the buyers of warrants. 
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Introduction and problem statement 
 
Warrants are instruments tracking an underlying asset in a 
way similar to an option and can be priced by means of the 
Black-Scholes model. In South Africa, warrants are issued 
on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange by independent 
financial institutions. Investors can simply buy these as they 
would a share and gain a leveraged exposure in the market. 
It does not require significant capital to take a position and 
even small investors can include an entire basket of warrants 
in their portfolio. 
 
Currently, seven institutions actively issue independent 
spreads of warrants on the JSE. Not all warrants trade with 
great depth and liquidity, and issuers compete for the 
popularity of their warrants. For the investor who has opted 
to take a position through warrants, selecting which issuer’s 
instrument to participate in, is an important decision. Issuers 
have different issuing strategies offering dissimilar benefits 
and returns. The most crucial parameter to consider is the 
implied volatility, which is an indication of future 
movements in the price of the underlying assert. 
 
This article investigates the mechanics of warrants, implied 
volatility and how this parameter is incorporated into issuing 
strategies. Although implied volatilities are often published, 
the values were frequently found to be inaccurate. As a 
small difference in implied volatility could result in a 
significant difference in contract price, a method is 
presented to calculate more accurate implied volatilities. 
This is then applied to warrants issued by different writers to 
analyse the types of strategies followed by issuers. 
 
A second section introduces the warrants trading on the JSE 
while Section 3 deals with volatility and the various 
measurements thereof. The empirical analysis follows in 
Section 4 and in Section 5 issuer strategies are analysed. 
Section 6 contains the conclusion. 
 
Warrants trading on the JSE 
 
In American and most European financial markets, a 
warrant is a security issued by a company which provides 
the holder with the right to buy a share in the company at a 
fixed price during the life of the warrant. It is thus a call 
option issued by a firm on its own stock in order to raise 
funds. Such warrants have to be valued in a different way 
than other call options, since exercising the warrant affects 
the value of the underlying asset. It increases the shares 
outstanding and brings fresh cash into the company, both of 
which will affect the share price. The expected negative 
impact (dilution) of an exercise makes the warrants less 
valuable than otherwise similar call options. 
 
In German, Australian and South African financial markets, 
warrants are independent derivative instruments issued by 
financial institutions which trade on the stock exchange 
where the underlying asset is listed. On exercise of an in-
the-money warrant, it is sold back to the issuer with no 
affect on the underlying asset. The Black-Scholes equation 
therefore should hold for these warrants. 
 
Warrants are commercial retail products. Warrant writers 
enter long positions either in assets or their derivatives on 
SAFEX (which requires significant capital) and then short 




the JSE. Private and small investors can then afford to take 
long option positions in the form of put and call warrants. 
This of course comes at a cost as any retail product would. 
The warrants trade more expensively than their counterparts 
on SAFEX, all parameters being equal. 
 
A separate market emerges that trade these instruments in 
which the investor can buy and sell options tracking the 
underlying asset at a premium price. The market, however, 
loses efficiency due to the fact that the warrant has to be 
bought from the writer and therefore eliminates the 
opportunity of arbitrage through shorting overly expensive 
warrants. This contributes to the escalated price of the 
warrant. If the warrant were to trade at a price lower than its 
counterpart on SAFEX, an arbitrageur could enter the 
market by going long in the warrant and shorting a similar 
option on SAFEX. This is, however, only a distant 
possibility, as the writers maintain an elevated price.1 
 
Turning attention to the Black-Scholes equation for options, 
the price difference presents itself in the volatility, which is 
the only uncertain parameter. If volatility is calculated using 
the known parameters of time, asset and option spot price, 
interest rate and strike price, it gives an indication of what 
the entire market expects volatility to be. However, in the 
case of warrants the writers manage to control this value 
through their asking or bidding price as the only short player 
in the market. 
 
The JSE allows the ruling price of an asset to move when no 
trade occurs in an attempt to reflect the market’s opinion 
more accurately. In the case of warrants, the issuer utilises 
this status quo to influence the price of the warrant so that it 
continues to track the underlying asset at a specific volatility 
when no volume changes hands. For instance, had the 
underlying share price moved considerably bullish on a 
particular day, and no trade occurred on the warrant, the 
writer can simply enter a bid price higher than the previous 
traded price before markets close, and the JSE will record 
this as the closing price. This becomes a continuous exercise 
and is part of ‘market-making’. If the writer’s market-
making ability is disciplined and unbiased, however, traders 
can expect the warrant to trade as a fairly valued derivative 
instrument. 
 
When trading occurs, the ruling price of the warrant 
becomes the price at which trade occurs. When no volume is 
trading, the JSE rules state that the closing price becomes 
either the bid price if this is higher than the last traded price 
or the asking price if this is lower than the last traded price, 
creating a range of non-traded price fluctuations. When both 
bid and ask prices exist within the range, yet no trade 
occurs, the ruling price remains the last traded price. If no 
trade has occurred on a particular day, the previous day’s 
close substitutes for the last traded price. 
 
Issuing a warrant is a composite undertaking and requires 
depth in the financial institution. The trading dynamics have 
to be managed throughout the life of a warrant in order to 
                                           
1The writers maintain an influence on the price by shorting more 
warrants to supplement the open interest in the market or neutralising 
existing open interest. (See Section 3.) 
create a sensible instrument.  The different independent 
issuers on the JSE are as follows: 
 
 
Table 1: Institutions issuing warrants on the JSE 
 
Issuer Issuer Key
BNP PARIBAS BP 
DEUTSCHE BANK DB 
GENSEC BANK GB 
INVESTEC BANK IB 
SOCIETY GENERAL SG 
STANDARD BANK SB 
UBS WARBURG UB 
 
 
In addition to these, the mining house Harmony has entered 
the market in issuing independent warrants specifically on 
their own shares. This initiative was sparked after numerous 
complaints were made to the company about biased market-
making by independent issuers. The three largest volume 
issuers, Standard Bank, Investec Bank and Deutsche Bank 
dominate the market and the smallest volume issuers, UBS 
Warburg and Gensec Bank often have no trades in their 
instruments. 
 
In order to track the underlying share price, market makers 
use various trading parameters and not necessarily the actual 
traded price. A popular method is to use the average of the 
bid and offer prices for the underlying asset in the market 
and to incorporate a desired volatility parameter to calculate 
the warrant price. Market-making then consists of 
maintaining bid and offer prices for the warrant below and 
above their calculated price. This method allows the market 
maker to track movements in the underlying more closely, 
because the next trading price of the underlying is likely to 
be in between the current bid and offer prices. It does not, 
however, weigh supply and demand and cannot anticipate 




The volatility of an asset price is a measure of uncertainty 
about the returns provided from an investment in the asset 
and is measured by the variability in its price over time 
(usually over one year). For a share it is usually the standard 
deviation of the continuously compounded returns provided 
by an investment in the share. 
 
One estimate of future volatility of the asset underlying an 
option is by using historical prices and assuming that the 
realised level of volatility will continue into the future. 
Estimating volatility from historical data depends on the 
time frame of volatility interested in. Usually a standard 
deviation of the daily percentage changes in the share price 
is calculated for a period equal to that which the investor 
intends to hold the option. The asset price is observed at 
fixed intervals (i.e. daily at close) and the natural logarithms 














where Si is the spot price in period i. 
 










∑ ∑  for n days, 
 
divided by the square root of the number of trading days per 




 where τ usually is 250 days. 
 
Of course, it remains questionable whether historical 
volatility can be used to forecast future volatility. 
 
When dealing with options, implied volatility is widely 
believed to be informationally superior to historical 
volatility, because it is the market’s forecast of future 
volatility (Jarrow, 1998:211). This holds if it is assumed that 
the Black-Scholes volatility computed from the market price 
of an option is a good estimate of the market’s expectation 
of the underlying asset’s volatility, if the market’s 
expectation is informationally efficient and if perfect 
liquidity exists in the option market. 
 
In options markets, the implied Black-Scholes volatilities 
vary with both strike and expiration. This variation, known 
as the implied volatility smile, is a significant and persistent 
feature of most index options (Jarrow, 1998:367). 
Graphically it manifests if the implied volatility of an option 
is plotted as a function of its strike. Out-of and in-the money 
options have higher implied volatilities than at the money 
options and from there, the ‘smile’. 
 
For most warrants, however, implied volatility is found to be 
a poor forecast of subsequent realised volatility. Partly the 
problem arises from the methodology used to calculate the 
estimated volatility. 
 
The Black-Scholes formulas for both calls and puts cannot 
be arranged in such a way that volatility (σ) is expressed in 
terms of the other parameters (spot and strike price, interest 
rate, time to expiry and option price). Thus, an iterative 
search process is used to determine an implied volatility, 
which is accurate within an acceptable tolerance. Using 
known historical information and guessing an implied 
volatility, a value for the call (put) is determined and 
compared to the actual call (put) value. A positive 
exponential relationship exists between volatility and the 
call (put) price, so that if the calculated value is higher than 
the actual value, the next iteration incorporates a lower 




( )n n 1
1 calculated price
x actual price −
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σ = + σ  
where: 
 
σn-1 is the estimate in the previous iteration; 
actual price is the warrant spot; and 
x is a sensitivity parameter (1 to 7). 
 
Through the iteration process, the values calculated for the 
implied volatility approach a value corresponding to the 
actual option price. The lower the value for the sensitivity 
parameter, the faster a value within an acceptable tolerance 
is reached. Certain combinations of spot and strike prices 
force the calculated values to oscillate divergently around 
the corresponding value. By increasing the sensitivity 
parameter, the oscillations reduce so that the calculated 
volatilities converge towards the corresponding option 
value. Nine iterations are usually sufficient to achieve this 
value for any combination of parameters, given that the 
sensitivity parameter allows for convergence. The 
acceptable tolerance is set such that the error is negligible 
over the entire spectrum of parameters. This error (ε) is 
measured as the difference between the actual option price 
and the calculated option price from the previous volatility, 
as follows: 
 
( )calculated price actual price
actual price
−
ε =  
 
A feasible error tolerated between the actual and calculated 
option price for the purpose of the empirical investigation is 
+ 0,3% for all data excluding the last two months to expiry. 
An error of 0,3% leaves sufficient room to identify 
discrepancies between different implied volatilities. Time to 
expiry is a dominant factor in relating volatility and option 
price and it is found that, due to time decay within the last 
two months, price becomes less sensitive to changes in 
volatility so that this prescribed error cannot guarantee a 
realistic representative implied volatility. Therefore data 
within the last two months to expiry is omitted from 
investigation. 
 
The standard deviation estimate of volatility was developed 
for liquid and efficient options markets. When examining 
the implied volatility of a warrant, there seems to be little 
correlation with subsequently realised volatility, nor does it 
reflect the information contained in recent observed 
volatility. For example, Figure 1 illustrates the implied 
volatility of a BNP Paribas call warrant on Anglo-Platinum 
for the period up to 23 August 2001 being ~ approximately 
55% at close on that day. Observing the share price from 
this day onwards and calculating the standard deviation in 
the change of the subsequent share price from this day on 
(and increasing the days to moving average), it approaches a 
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The empirical study compares historical warrant pricing 
dynamics. Because the actual price at which trade occur 
gives the best indication of the market’s sentiment, all 
implied volatilities are calculated using market closing 
prices for both warrants and their underlying assets as 
published by the JSE rules of trading. 
 
As the price of an underlying asset changes, only a portion 
of the fluctuation in the corresponding warrant price can be 
attributed to implied volatility changes. When warrants with 
identical strike and underlying asset parameters, issued by 
different writers are compared, discrepancies in the market’s 
implied volatility can be seen, because writers manage to 
maintain different implied volatilities. To illustrate this, 
Figure 2 shows the differences in warrant prices and the 
resulting implied volatilities between identical Anglo call 
warrants issued by BP and IB between August and 
December 2001. The warrant prices have been multiplied by 
their cover ratio to represent the option on one share. Other 
warrant parameters are: 
 
 
Underlying Asset Anglo 
Strike price 1300c 
Expiry Date 20 March 2002 
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Figure 2: Anglo: BP vs IB Warrants 
Clear discrepancies can be seen in the price of otherwise 
similar warrants with differences in the resulting implied 
volatilities at times reaching almost 10%. No consistent 
pattern seems to be shared and the levels cross in magnitude 
sporadically. Naturally, when the price is higher, the implied 
volatility is higher. For an investor who would have liked to 
take a leveraged long position on Anglo during this time, the 
price difference induced by volatility differences could have 
meant a substantial difference in return on investment. 
 
The return on investment is calculated using the average 
warrant price over the remainder of the time period. Graph 3 
plots the percentage difference between the return on 
investment of the two warrants versus the difference 
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Figure 3: Anglo: ROI(BP-IB) vs Implied Vol (BP-IB)  
 
 
A clear linear relationship can be identified. The greater the 
difference in implied volatility when purchased, the higher 
the return on investment for a specific warrant if compared 
to its counterpart. A regression line drawn for the points 
delivers a R-square of 0,7653. Thus 76,5% of the 
discrepancies in return on investment can be described by 
the difference in implied volatility.  
 
To confirm this observation, a sample of similar pairs of 
warrants traded on the JSE were subjected to the same 
analysis. Unfortunately few identical warrants exist on the 
JSE and the sample included pairs of warrants with an 
expiry difference of not more than one day, and all other 
parameters equal. The maximum error occurring due to the 
day expiry difference is less than the +0,3% acceptable 
tolerance for all data excluding two months to expiry. A 
total of nine pairs of warrants were identified and included 
in the sample. All warrant prices are multiplied by their 
cover ratio’s to express an option on one share. The 
relationships all confirm the same pattern (details are 
available on request from the outlets). 
 








Table 2: Correlation between discrepancies in return on investment and differences in implied volatility for nine 
similar warrant pairs 
 
2AGLBP 13000 20/03/2002 BP USA Call 30147659
2AGLIB 13000 20/03/2002 IB USA Call 53107395
1AMSBP 40000 20/03/2002 BP USA Call 24635872
5AMSDB 40000 21/03/2002 DB USA Call 726192
4BILIB 7000 18/09/2002 IB USA Call 31304978
5BILDB 7000 17/09/2002 DB USA Call 0
1DTCSB 2000 21/03/2002 SB USA Call 3834916
4DTCBP 2000 20/03/2002 BP USA Call 736565
2FSRBP 1000 20/03/2002 BP USA Call 508989
3FSRDB 1000 21/03/2002 DB USA Call 19663
4INTBP 18000 20/03/2002 BP EURO Put 2586696
4INTSB 18000 21/03/2002 SB EURO Put 5318223
1KMBDB 3800 17/09/2002 DB USA Call 1641666,67
2KMBIB 3800 18/09/2002 IB USA Call 6260255,56
3OMLSB 2200 21/03/2002 SB USA Call 1135760
4OMLDB 2200 21/03/2002 DB USA Call 55479
2SAPBP 7000 20/03/2002 BP USA Call 21985201
4SAPDB 7000 21/03/2002 DB USA Call 2950710,5






















10/19/01 0,882  
 
 
The R-squares for the sample vary from 0,72 upwards, 
which shows excellent correlation. This means the 
observations are not mere random noise and confirms that 
there are indeed substantial differences in implied 
volatilities with explanatory power. 
 
As noted earlier, a fair price for the warrant, which includes 
the premium, is calculated by the issuer throughout the life 
of the warrant using a desired volatility parameter. The 
issuer maintains an influence on the actual trading price in 
the market by: 
 
• shorting more warrants at a asking price to supplement 
the open interest held by private investors, or 
 
• by reducing the open interest by neutralising some of 
the open interest with a bid price. 
 
The bulk of the open interest trades are among the investors 
themselves. Some market efficiency emerges in that an 
investor retains the choice in which issuer’s warrant to 
participate in. The volatility parameter used by the issuer to 
calculate a bid price for new warrants issued has a direct 
influence on the popularity of the warrant. Issuers compete 
to have the most attractive warrants in the market, which 
results in higher volume traded on these warrant. Issuers do 
not publish the total number of warrants issued (i.e. open 
interest in the market).2 It is therefore difficult to learn the 
                                           
2 It would only be possible to calculate the open interest in the market 
if all transactions since the birth of the warrant are monitored, although 
success of various strategies. No trading volume on a 
warrant is evidence of an unsuccessful strategy, although 




Issuing warrants is a potentially lucrative business. The 
issuers hedge their short position on the JSE, so not to have 
a naked position in the market and thus, do not profit from a 
move in the underlying price either way. The hedge usually 
takes one of the following forms: 
 
• by increasing (for calls) or reducing (for puts) their long 
position in the underlying asset3, or 
 
• buying similar derivatives on the derivative exchange or 
 
• purchasing customised over-the-counter (OTC) options 
wholesale. 
 
It was stated that a warrant always trades at premium 
volatility over observed volatility of the asset, which often 
decreases towards expiry. This phenomenon is explained by 
                                                                        
the trading system from 9th May 2002 permits only anonymous trading, 
which would render this impossible. 
 
3 Warrants provide an additional benefit to investors: Issuers hedge 
their positions in warrants shorted by buying the underlying after the 
warrant is bought. If a significant volume of warrants with a high 
gearing are purchased from the issuer, the amount of more expensive 
shares bought to hedge the position could move the price in favour of 




one of the ways in which some issuers secure profit. Initial 
proceeds are earned from the premium added through 
issuing at retail volatility higher than the wholesale 
volatility. Investors are willing to pay a premium, because a 
demand for such instruments exist and the investors do not 
have the capital to participate in the derivative exchange 
itself. If the warrant expires out-of-the-money, the issuer 
retains the premium difference. The implied volatility 
premium is also winded down gradually over the life of the 
warrant so that it can be effectively neutralised at a cheaper 
price. The profitability is thus a function of the open interest 
in the market and the difference in issuing- vs. neutralising- 
volatility.  
 
Warrants trading on the JSE are usually American, so that 
the issuer can neutralise open interest at any time, i.e. when 
there are no buyers in the market for investors wanting to 
sell. This also means liquidity is guaranteed for an in-the-
money warrant. When the demand of an issuer’s warrant is 
down, neutralising some of the open interest creates 
artificial demand and escalates the price by law of supply 
and demand. When the market demand is up, the issuer 
would short more warrants creating supply, which deflates 
the price and increases the open interest towards greater 
proceeds. The strategy is thus to increase the open interest in 
the long term and to influence the supply and demand to 
maintain the implied volatility at the issuers discression. 
When the open interest is expanding, the issuer would 
benefit from maintaining a higher implied volatility so that 
the new warrants are issued dearly. When the open interest 
is contracting, the issuer would benefit from maintaining a 
lower implied volatility so that the warrants are neutralised 
cheaply. 
 
By studying the sample of similar warrants’ volatility, a 
fairly consistent hierarchy in the discrepancies emerges. 
Some issuers constantly maintain a higher level of implied 
volatility. Deutsche Bank warrants most frequently have the 
lowest implied volatility and Investec Bank warrants 
frequently have the highest. Issuer strategies are thus similar 
as other retail products. A low cost leadership would aim at 
maintaining a low implied volatility and thus resulting in 
lower cost warrants. Differentiation strategies maintain 
higher implied volatilities and resulting prices, and market 
the warrant more aggressively or offer special attributes to 
the warrant. 
 
Such attributes include consistency in the implied volatility. 
While low cost strategy issuers’ instruments might fluctuate 
speciously, a differentiated issuer aims at maintaining an 
implied volatility, which corresponds to the actual 
impulsiveness of the share price. Some issuers vow to 
maintain the implied volatility consistently, regardless of 
changes in the impulsiveness of the underlying share. 
Investors increasingly prefer this consistency to provide 
predictability in their investment. 
 
Some differentiated issuers offer more unique instruments, 
such as index warrants and compound warrants, which are 
warrants on warrants that naturally provide higher gearing. 
Deep-in-the-money warrants are issued as a new special 
instrument that the investor holds for exposure to a long-
term leveraged position. Differentiated issuers would also 
pay commission to traders for pushing their product. The 
success of commission structures is questionable because it 
attracts quick-traders who do not contribute to the long-term 
open interest. Differentiation of distribution in the case of 
warrants means the issuer have efficient electronic systems 
enhancing communication with the traders and often 
providing information regarding their warrants, making it 
more appealing for the trader to recommend. 
 
Identifying exactly which strategy an issuer pursues is 
complex. In order for an issuer to maintain a strategic level 
of implied volatility on a warrant, a critical mass of open 
interest must be achieved. An issuer cannot control the 
supply and demand if the open interest is too small or 
liquidity is insufficient. The issuer then needs to drop the 
volatility and price to attract investors and thus might be 
confused with having a low cost strategy, because the open 
interest is not made public. 
 
Some issuers recently altered their strategies. Bank Paribas 
and Gensec Bank both have repositioned themselves 
through lowering their general implied volatilities. The 
implied volatilities of warrants listed on the JSE for each 
share were compared to estimate the average overall issuing 
strategies. The following table describes the hierarchy of 
implied volatilities and other strategies: 
 
 
Table 3:  Issuing strategies 
 
Attributes
BNP PARBAS x no
DEUTSCHE BANK x no
GENSEC BANK x no Specialised products, High Doubles
NVESTEC BANK x yes Consistent Vols, Efficient Distribuion
SOCETY GENERAL x no
STANDARD BANK x yes Consistent Vols
UBS WARBURG x no Distinguished House Image
Implied Volatility Strategy
Commission 





Choosing in which issuer’s warrant to participate can lead to 
significant differences in the outcome of an investment. The 
fact that issuers exert influence on the supply and demand 
on their instruments (thus controlling the level of implied 
volatility) and pay commission to traders, prove that the 
warrant market is less than efficient. It is recommended that 
issuers publish the open interest of their warrants along with 
the price and volatility. This would allow investors to 
monitor the influence exerted by the issuer and determine 
the depth of the actual market, which would result in a more 
efficient market. 
 
From observing the evidence of return on investment vs. 
implied volatility, it seems that low implied volatility 
warrants hold more benefit for investors than differentiation 
strategy issuer’s warrants. Because issuers earn profits 
mainly from the difference between wholesale and retail 
prices of instruments, the implied volatility of a warrant has 
a floor level below which the market-makers would not drop 
their volatility. Warrants with the lower implied volatility 




value of the open interest. Consistent regression results, 
confirm that a relationship exists between higher returns and 
purchasing at low implied volatilities. 
 
Warrants which incorporate commission paid to brokers and 
high marketing costs holds no additional benefit to 
investors. Consistency in implied volatility though, provides 
certainty and a more impartial price, both beneficial to the 
investor. Investors have recently started to take note of these 
issues and are ‘voting with their feet’. They are increasingly 
supporting institutions that maintain consistent levels of 
implied volatility. Traders avoid issuers that move their 
volatilities to match the underlying impulsiveness, because 
it often becomes an issue of how this level is measured and 
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